Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago IL, 2000; cloth, 330 pp.

This book addresses a depressing subject -- the fate of US POWs during the Korean War (Jun 1950-July 1953).

Of the 7,190 who were captured (mostly in the first nine months of the war), approximately 3000 died in captivity, a mortality of 43%, largely of starvation over a six month period (Nov 1950- April 1951 ). This compares with WW II rates: 4% of US prisoners in Germany (considered a normal rate, reflecting the Geneva convention), 34% in Japan (rightly condemned as barbarous), 45% of German POWs held by the Soviets, and 60% of Soviet POWs held by the Germans. Of 766 US POWs officially held by North Vietnam (1965-1973), 106 deaths were reported (14%) (Lech, pp. 1-2) (I do not believe this figure for North Vietnam includes about 100 MIAs, commonly presumed to have died unreported in captivity).

(Chinese Communist apologists sometimes claim the starvation was caused by US bombing, preventing the delivery of food. In response, Lech points out that, while North Korean supply routes were heavily bombed, the POW camps were right on the border of China itself, exempted from bombing.)

In the early summer of 1951, the purposeful starvation of US POWs ceased. At this point, POW treatment entered a new phase, in some ways even more disturbing to the US public than the (invisible) murder-by-starvation: mass indoctrination in anti-American propaganda (sometimes known as "brainwashing") and recruitment of POWs to regurgitate said anti-American propaganda in signed statements and public broadcasts.
The term "brainwashing" would eventually fall out of favor, largely because the Communist indoctrination turned out to have no permanent effect on most POWs, once they returned home.

A crucial turning-point came on 27 Dec 1951, when the Communists finally exchanged the names of POWs with the UN forces. At last POWs had some assurance they wouldn't be idly beaten to death or shot, since their captors would have to explain their non-appearance at the end of the war. (Lech, p. 150)

This emboldened a mass strike by about 400 NCOs in March 1952 to demand an end to mandatory indoctrination classes. MSgt Ralph Krieger commented later, "It was the first time since we had been captured that we acted like American soldiers." The Chinese command gave in, and indoctrination became voluntary. (Lech, p. 150)

About 25% of the POWs, the "progressives," continued to attend, while a smaller number, the "reactionaries," made clear their disdain for Communism and collaborators. "Progressives" could look forward to better food, more consideration, and occasional flattery from their captors.

Some specialized points

Starvation broke the spirit of POWs in 1950-1951. They ceased to help each other, resulting in higher death rates.
Any attempts by officers to take command, forcing men to cooperate in their common interest, were broken up by Communist guards, unless the officers were willing to become collaborators. This was the choice of Lt. Col. Paul Liles and Lt. Col. Harry Fleming. They cooperated in producing Communist propaganda, but in return were allowed to cut the death rate of men in their camp. Both were court-martialed as collaborators after the war, and one was drummed out of the service. Author Lech seems to feel this was unjust: True, they made Communist propaganda (as did many others who were not court-martialed), but they also saved many lives.

Elsewhere, men were too apathetic to defend their comrades (or even themselves) against predators and thugs like Sgt. James Gallagher and PFC Rothwell Floyd. In one notorious incident, 17 Feb 1951, Gallagher tossed two prisoners, gravely weakened by dysentery, outside the barracks, where they froze to death (Lech, p. 74). Gallagher could argue that the stink of unwashed dysentery patients was revolting; nevertheless, when POWs accept a duty to care for each other, they have a much higher survival rate.

Collaboration

Among the most notorious pro-Communist propagandists were 35 POWs, including Lt. Cols. Liles and Fleming, at a special Camp 12 in Pyongyang, later known among other POWs as "Traitors' Row."

36 pilots signed confessions to using germ warfare.

Non-repatriation

US authorities documented 66 US personnel kept against their will by Communist forces after the end of war: 43 USAF, 12 civilian, and 11 Coast Guard or Navy (Lech, p. 280). Mostly they had been captured outside of Korea, usually in China, and did not come under the terms of the armistice. It was hoped that diplomatic means would secure their later release, but nothing ever came of it.

Manchurian Candidates?

The Chinese Communists hoped, and Americans feared, that "brainwashed" POWs, especially the "progressives," would remain susceptible to Communist influence after the armistice, when they were returned to the USA.
The Communists put special emphasis on meetings of "progressives" in the last few weeks of captivity, hoping they would maintain their "progressive" network back in the USA. Once the POWs returned to the USA, however, the "progressive" organization disappeared without a trace.

23 POWs (later reduced to 21) voluntarily renounced their US citizenship to remain in China after the war.

Many Americans feared the dismal statistics for US POWs (deaths, collaboration, defection) indicated weakness in the national character. It was noted that some foreign allies, eg the Turks, seemed to bear up better in captivity. But it is possible also that US POWs were more systematically starved and abused.

This Korean War "moral panic" about "brainwashed" POWs bears analogy to Vietnam War fears of returning GIs addicted to heroin. Heroin use and addiction by GIs in Vietnam was indeed widespread, but famous studies by Lee N. Robins
http://www.bookrags.com/research/vietnam-follow-up-study-edaa-03/
found that, a year after they returned, Vietnam veterans were addicted at no higher a rate than similar classes of non-veterans. Opportunities in a free and prosperous society overcome both psychological pressures of cruel captivity and physical addictions assumed to cope with a boring and dangerous environment.

Lessons Learned

by the USA
A need was recognized to give soldiers realistic instructions on their duty if captured. Before the Korean War, they had been told nothing, except to reveal only "name, rank, and serial number." Post-Korean-War training would include realistic advice on how to regain self-respect (and the will to live) even if tortured into giving more than "name, rank, and serial number." The need for collective support and survival was stressed. The most important information for a POW to collect was the names and identity of as many fellow POWs as possible, to make it less likely their captors would feel they could be safely murdered. (Vietnam War POWs, kept in solitary, would show ingenuity acquiring and transmitting this information; the enemy would try to silence and isolate them with fiendish tortures.)
Senior POW officers were required to assume command, and junior POWs were required to obey them.

by the Communists
Although the North Vietnamese would torture and kill US POWs during the Vietnam war (1965-73) and put some on camera, they did not devote much effort to indoctrination and "reeducation." The Korean War experience showed that such indoctrination would not last, and was not worth the effort.

Lessons that should have been learned

Lech emphasizes the need for centralized disposition of the POW cases.

US POWs captured by Communist forces during the Korean War

service branch	number captured	number repatriated	suspected of collaboration	cleared	eased out of service
USA (Army)	6,656
USAF (Air Force)	263	220	88	69	10
USMC (Marine Corps)	231
USN (Navy)	40
-	----
total	7,190

Returned POWs put on trial by the US Army

Rank and name	charge	disposition	Notes
Lt. Col. Paul Liles	C	24 month "suspension in rank"	Camp 12 "Traitors' Row"
Lt. Col. Harry Fleming	C	dishonorable "dismissal" from service	Camp 12
Maj. Ronald Alley	C	5 years in prison	Camp 5. Personally unpopular, uncommunicative. Refused to take stand at court-martial
Maj. Ambrose Nugent	C	acquitted	Camp 12, president "Central Peace Committee"
Lt. Jeff Erwin	C	acquitted	Camp 12
M. Sgt William Olson	C	2 years in prison	made pro-Communist speeches, though no worse than many others
Sgt. William Banghart	C	1 year in prison
Sgt. John Tyler	C	acquitted	low credibility of accuser
Sgt. James Gallagher	C, M	paroled after 11 years
Cpl. Harold Dunn	C	2 1/2 years in prison	"progressive"
Cpl. Thomas Bayes	C	2 1/2 years in prison
Cpl. Edward Dickenson	C	paroled after 3 1/2 years in prison	Had been among 23 "nonrepatriates" who agreed to stay with Communists, but changed his mind
Cpl. Claude Batchelor	C	paroled after 4 1/2 years	"non-repatriate" leader
PFC. Rothwell Floyd	M, SO, MT	acquitted on murder charge 10 years in prison

Charges:

C -- collaboration. This usually meant signing anti-American documents, making anti-American speeches, or holding administrative posts in the indoctrination program.
M -- murder
SO -- striking an officer
MT -- mistreatment of fellow prisoners

Prison sentences also included a dishonorable discharge.
Many penalties were originally more severe, but got reduced during the appellate process.